It Looked Good on Paper by Bill Fawcett

Author:Bill Fawcett
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: HarperCollins

When Push Comes to Budget Crunch

It seems axiomatic in the Pentagon that the longer a weapons program takes, the more it will cost in the end.

The Comanche program reached $39 billion total. The Congressional Budget office was estimating in 1997 that the helicopter would have a flyaway price of $26 million, well above the $7.5 million originally considered pricey. Upgrading the existing fleet of OH-58s would be a bargain at $1.3 billion over five years.

This took place as the Army was struggling to maintain its 10-division strength in 1996-97. The money needed to do that was being consumed by various weapons programs. Wouldn’t it make sense to kill the Comanche, just to free up the money?

The Army answered with a study that concluded that the Comanche had a higher likelihood of survivability compared to the Kiowa.

That’s on the battlefield.

But during peacetime, wars are fought over budgets, not terrain.

The Comanche was flying around with a big bulls-eye drawn on it in the shape of a dollar sign.

Development continued through 1997, but the weight problem could not be licked. The Comanche was now up to 8,943 pounds empty—that is, without fuel, ammo, or crew. The budget dollars needed to put the chopper on a diet could not be found. The RAH-66 would go on a development hiatus instead, being grounded for the next 18 months to save money.

Another money-saving move was to push purchase dates back. First it was delayed from 2001 to 2003, then back further to 2006. The longer this program took, the more likely it would be overtaken by events. The General Accounting Office took one look at the need for a recon helicopter and realized it could get the same job done for $4.5 billion if the Army used unmanned reconnaissance vehicles (UAVs). Firepower would be lacking, but the recon capability would be better and the vehicles could be lost without losing aircrew. But the Army was not willing to surrender the program just yet.

The Comanche resumed testing in 1999. Prototype number two took to the air. It was going to be the test bed for the Mission Equipment Package (MEP)—the array of sensors and weapons that would give the Comanche its killing power. Budget questions still dogged the program. There simply was not enough money to both pay for the RAH-66 and keep modernizing existing helicopters.

Modernization was always the cheaper option, especially since it could keep the OH-58 flying until 2025, again undermining the need for the Comanche. In terms of operating costs, a key metric of the peacetime military, the OH-58 only cost $1,100 per flight hour compared to the $2,200 to $2,400 for the AH-64. If the Army purchased the AH-64D upgrade for its AH-64As, it would get the Comanche’s capabilities (without stealth) for a much lower cost and still perform the recon mission.

For the RAH-66, the challenge was maintaining justification for an expensive helicopter whose job could be done by cheaper, existing models. The Army didn’t see it that way. “We need to get

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